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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 26, 2005, in a decision that received very little
attention from the American media, Immigration Judge William
Abbott ruled that Luis Posada-Carriles could not be extradited to
Venezuela, where he faced charges in connection with the 1976
bombing of a Cuban airliner that killed seventy-three people.'
Judge Abbott relied on the United Nations Convention Against
Torture (CAT) and held that there was sufficient grounds Posada
would face torture and possible extradition to Cuba if he were
deported to Venezuela.2 Under CAT, the "burden of proof is on the
applicant.. .to establish that it is more likely than not the he or
she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
removal."' The United States government, the party "seeking"
extradition, did not present any witnesses and did not offer any
evidence that Posada would not be tortured if extradited to Vene-
zuela.4 Thus, it was not very difficult for Posada to meet his bur-
den under CAT.
As indicated by the Posada decision, if the government seek-
ing extradition decides that it does, or does not, want an alien
extradited, it has enormous influence over the decision. The stan-
dard for CAT relief is extremely malleable and allows for political
ideology to influence its results, particularly when involving sus-
pected terrorists in the United States. This article will first offer a
background of the history and purpose of CAT. It will then
examine the standards necessary for relief under CAT and how
these standards are applied to suspected terrorists. From there,
the article will analyze the Posada decision in great detail.
Finally, this article will assess the political implications of the
Posada decision and offer possible solutions to avoid such grossly
politicized and unjust results in the future.
1. Oscar Corral, Judge: Posada to Stay in U.S. for Now, MIAMi HERALD, Sep. 28,
2005, at Al.
2. In re Posada-Carriles, No. A-12 419 708, at 1 (Dept. of Justice, Exec. Office for
Immigr. Review Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Posada Immigration Decision], available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/POSADA DECISION3_9-26-
05.pdf (last visited April 17, 2006). This decision is unpublished. My attempts to
obtain a written copy of the decision from Eduardo Soto, P.A. (the firm that
represented Posada) and the Immigration Court in El Paso, Texas were unsuccessful.
Perhaps even the court itself was embarrassed by the decision. Fortunately, I was
able to find a copy of the decision at the above listed website.
3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2006).
4. Corral, supra note 1, at Al.
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II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE (CAT)
A. History and Purpose
The United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December
10, 1984,1 out of a desire "to make more effective the struggle
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment throughout the world."6 The primary provision of
CAT is within Article 3, which states that "[n]o State Party shall
expel, return . . .or extradite a person to another State where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in
danger of being subjected to torture."7 In determining whether
there are such grounds, "all relevant considerations" shall be
taken into account including "the existence in the State concerned
of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights."8
Article 3 of CAT was incorporated into United States law in
October of 1998 with the passage of the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act (FARRA) § 2242(a) of FARRA provides:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds
for believing the person would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physi-
cally present in the United States. °
Implementing regulations were issued in February of 1999,
which created new procedures for applying relief under CAT."
Immigration judges usually have jurisdiction in the first instance
5. Richard P. Shafer, Construction and Application of United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or Punishment,
184 A.L.R. FED. 385, at *2 (LEXIS) (2005).
6. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
7. Id art 3.
8. Id.
9. Anwen Hughes, Withholding of Removal, in BASIc IMMIGRATION LAW 2004, at
327, 332 (PLI New York Practice Skills, Course Handbook Series No. 2930, 2004).
10. Id. (citing Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA)
§ 2242(a), 22 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006)).
11. Id. (citing Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed.
Reg. 8477-8496 (Feb. 19, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. Pts. 3, 103, 208, 235, 238, 240,
241, 253, and 507)).
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to decide CAT claims. 2 Judicial review of CAT claims are permit-
ted, but only as a part of a "review of a final order of removal pur-
suant to [§] 242 of the INA."
13
B. Standard of Relief Under CAT
To gain protection under CAT, an applicant must "establish
that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal."14 There must be
persuasive evidence of the likelihood of torture in order to get CAT
protection.1 5 CAT specifically defines torture as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other per-
son acting in an official capacity. s
As interpreted by courts in the United States, for an act to
constitute torture it must be: "'(1) an act causing severe physical
or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for a pro-
scribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official 7 who-has custody or physical
control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions.
' 18
The denial of CAT protection by an Immigration Judge is
reviewed under the "highly deferential" 9 substantial evidence
test, which requires the court to affirm the Immigration Judge's
order if it is "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole."2° An Immigration
12. Id.
13. Id. at 332-33.
14. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added). See also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d
1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003).
15. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2).
16. CAT, supra note 6, art 1.
17. Acquiescence of a public official includes both "awareness and willful blindness
and does not require actual knowledge or 'willfil[ I accept[ance].'" Zheng, 332 F3d at
1197 (citing INS v. Ventura, 123 S.Ct. 353, 355).
18. Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting In re J-E-, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 291, 297 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a))).
19. Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2004).
20. Id (quoting Karapetian v. INS, 162 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1998).
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Judge's legal analysis is reviewed de novo.2'
"'Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment
and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.' ' 22 In addition, "mental pain and suf-
fering will only constitute torture when 'prolonged mental harm'
results from the occurrence or threat, to oneself or another, of
'severe physical pain or suffering,' the administration of 'mind
altering substances,' or 'imminent death.
'' 2 3
"'[A]ll evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture
shall be considered"' in determining whether it is more likely than
not that an applicant will be tortured.24 Specifically, there are
four types of relevant evidence a court should consider:
(1) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (2)
Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the
country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tor-
tured; (3) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights within the country of removal, where appli-
cable; and (4) Other relevant information regarding condi-
tions in the country of removal.25
What constitutes "torture" is essential in determining
whether an applicant will receive CAT protection. For example,
under CAT, "substandard prison conditions are not a basis for
relief ... unless they are intentionally and deliberately created
and maintained in order to inflict torture."26 In addition, isolated
reports of physical beatings by prison guards do not necessarily
establish that such beatings are so pervasive that they indicate a
likelihood of torture. 27 Thus, in order to establish a likelihood of
21. Singh v. Gonzalez, 413 F.3d 156, 160 (1st Cir. 2005).
22. Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1131(7th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(2) (2004)).
23. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(4) (2004)).
24. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2004)).
25. Id. (quoting § 208.16(c)(3) (2004)).
26. Shafer, supra note 5, at *4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2005); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1) (2005); Alemu v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2005))."
27. 'While isolated reports of physical beatings of prisoners by Haitian guards
might constitute evidence of torture, Haitian national failed to establish that such
beatings were so pervasive within prisons in Haiti that it was more likely than not
that he would be subjected to such beatings if returned to Haiti and imprisoned
pursuant to Haiti's policy of detaining criminal deportees; alien did not claim that he
had been tortured in past and failed to make requisite showing for grant of relief
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) as enacted into domestic law by the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA)." Id., at 21b (citing Auguste
v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005)).
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torture, an applicant needs to meet a high threshold.
The burden on the applicant to establish that it is more likely
than not that he or she will be tortured if removed shifts to the
government only after the applicant has "established that he has
suffered persecution in the past or that his persecutor is a govern-
ment or is government sponsored."28 Therefore, unless the appli-
cant presents evidence to establish at least one of these two
conditions, the burden remains with the applicant throughout the
immigration proceedings.
C. CAT as Applied to Suspected Terrorists
Federal regulations provide that:
an alien whose removal has been ordered by the Alien Ter-
rorist Removal Court under the special procedures set forth
in Title V of the Act shall not be removed to a particular
country if the Attorney General determines, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, that removal to that country
would violate Article 3.29
Rights under CAT are "non-derogable, meaning that they can-
not be suspended, not even in times of emergency." 30 Article 2 of
CAT states that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever,
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political insta-
bility or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justifi-
cation of torture."3'
1. Withholding of Removal
Applicants for withholding under CAT are subject to the
28. Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Bace v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1138 n.3, 1140 (7th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(3)(ii)
(2004)).
29. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,
8480 (Feb. 19, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(f) (2006).
30. Leslie Palti, Combating Terrorism While Protecting Human Rights, U.N.
CHRON., Dec. 2004-Feb. 2005 at 27, 28, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/
2004/issue4/0404p27.html.
31. CAT, supra note 6, art 2. There is still debate as to whether the United States
Senate fully adopted Article 2 when CAT was ratified in 1994. However, "[a]lthough
its 1994 ratification was accompanied by a reservation adopting 'a more restrictive
definition of torture' than that set out in the Convention, the Senate stated no
'reservations' to-and, therefore, fully accepted-Article 2(2)'s provision . ... "
Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment" The Ban on Torture in
the Wake of September 11, 81 TEx. L. REV. 2013, 2014-15 (2003) (quoting John T.
Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an
Option?, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 743, 746 (2002)).
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nearly identical mandatory bars of removal contained in
§ 241(b)(3)(B) of the Act. The mandatory denials to withholding
apply if the Attorney General decides that:
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of an individual because of the
individual's race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion;
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of
the United States
(iii) there are serious reasons to believe that the alien com-
mitted a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United
States before the alien arrived in the United States; or
(iv) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is
a danger to the security of the United States.33
Thus, the Attorney General plays an important role in immi-
gration proceedings. The fourth exception, which calls for a
mandatory denial of withholding if the Attorney General decides
that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a
danger to the security of the United States,"34 is the most relevant
to cases involving suspected terrorists. "Reasonable grounds
exist to believe that an alien is a danger to the security of the
United States if the alien 'has engaged, is engaged, or at any time
after admission engages in any terrorist activity (as defined in sec-
tion 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) ... ).'"3 Under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii), "terrorist
activity" is defined as:
[a]ny activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place
where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in
the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State) and which involves any of the
following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (includ-
ing an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure,
or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel
a third person (including a governmental organization) to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
32. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,
8478-81 (Feb. 19, 1999). (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006)).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2006).
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
35. Bellout v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), 1227(a)(4)(B)(2004)).
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condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected per-
son (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the
liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any -
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or
device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device
(other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent
to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing.
3 6
Under § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv), the term "engage in terrorist activ-
ity" means "in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization":
(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances
indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily
injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist
activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for-
(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or
(vi)(II); or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasona-
bly have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization;
(V) to solicit any individual-
(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this
subsection;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in
clause (vi)(III) unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization; or
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006).
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(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support, including a safe
house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of
funds or other material financial benefit, false documenta-
tion or identification, weapons (including chemical, biologi-
cal, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training-
(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist
activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or
(II) of clause (vi) or to any member of such an organization;
or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III),
or to any member of such an organization, unless the actor
can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known,
that the organization was a terrorist organization. 7
Because terrorist activity is defined very broadly, CAT relief
can be withheld for a number of reasons. Courts have struggled to
apply the doctrine consistently. In Bellout v. Ashcroft the Ninth
Circuit found that there was substantial evidence which sup-
ported the Immigration Judge's conclusion that the applicant was
"engaged in or was likely to engage in terrorist activity."38 The
decision was based on the applicant's own testimony that he was a
member of the Armed Islamic Group, a "State Department-desig-
nated terrorist organization," for three years in Algeria. 9 Because
the applicant was engaged in terrorist activity, the court found
that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was "'a danger to
the security of the United States."'4 ° Thus, the applicant was not
eligible for statutory removal and withholding under CAT, despite
the threat of torture he may have faced in Algeria.4
Arias v. Gonzales is another recent case that illustrates the
broad application of the term "engages in terrorist activity" and
the difficulty faced by a suspected terrorist seeking withholding of
removal under CAT. In this case a Colombian citizen, Arias, ille-
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
38. Bellout, 363 F3d at 978.
39. Id. at 977-78.
40. Id. at 978 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2)
(2003)).
41. Id.
42. Arias v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. App'x. 464 (3d Cir. 2005). This case was not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter and is not precedential.
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gally entered the United States with the use of a fraudulent visa."'
A designated terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia ("FARC") was, according to the court "known
to extort so-called 'war taxes' from civilians in order to finance its
operations."" Arias joined the Colombian police force in 1991.
45
His duties there included fighting guerillas who were members of
FARC.46 After working a few years, Arias quit his position with
the police force and began working in an area which he knew to be
controlled by FARC In 1997 a man approached Arias and gave
him an envelope marked "Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colom-
bia" and told him to give it to another individual (Guiterrez).
4
Arias was not threatened, but was later told by Guiterrez that the
letter demanded payment to FARC of a monthly "tax."49 Guiterrez
then directed Arias to "pay the tax on his behalf with funds pro-'
vided by Guiterrez" and Arias agreed.5" According to the facts,
each month approximately fifty armed FARC guerrillas would
come to receive the payments.51 Although Arias was never
threatened, he "was constantly afraid of them and believed they
would kill him if he did not pay them."52 Arias also testified that
"he never supported or agreed with FARC's political agenda."53
The Immigration Judge denied Arias' applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, on the grounds
that the payments Arias made to FARC on Guiterrez's behalf
"rendered him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(3)(B) ... [which] pro-
vides that an alien is inadmissible to the United States where he
is found to have 'engaged in a terrorist activity. '' 5 4 The payments
fell under the category of a "commi[ssion ofl an act that the actor
knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support,
including.., transfer of funds or other material financial benefit
... to a terrorist organization .... 55
The issue of whether it is necessary for the conduct to be vol-
43. Id. at 465.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 465-66.







54. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2005)).
55. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc) (2005)).
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untary, as opposed to involuntary, was not addressed in the Third
Circuit's review. The Immigration Judge found that the provision
"applied regardless of whether the conduct at issue was volun-
tary"" and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with this
statutory construction. 7 Still, the Third Circuit concluded that
"substantial evidence" supported the Board's finding that "Arias
acted voluntarily when he made payments to the FARC" and
denied Arias's petition for asylum and withholding of removal on
this basis.5" This is a very broad reading of § 1182, especially in
light of the fact that FARC was known to kill individuals who did
not pay the monthly "tax."
5 9
Cheema v. Ashcroft 60 also dealt with the issue of whether an
alien was "engaging in terrorist activity." In that case, the Ninth
Circuit deferred to the Board's holding that the alien engaged in
terrorist activity "'by soliciting funds for individuals and
groups.. .that he knew or reasonably should have known or at
least had reason to believe had committed terrorist activity;' and
[by giving] material support to [the groups] by connecting calls to
them from Sikh militants."6 Thus, it does not take much for an
applicant to fall within the "engaging in terrorist activity"62 bar to
withholding of removal.
2. Deferral of Removal
If an alien is denied withholding of removal under CAT or
under § 241(b)(3), he or she still has the option of deferral of
removal. Deferral of removal has been described as a "limited
form of protection."' Before determining whether the mandatory
bars of § 241(b)(3)(B) apply, the Immigration Judge is required to
find whether or not the alien is more likely than not to be tortured
if removed. 5  If the bars to withholding of removal of
§ 241(b)(3)(B) do not apply, the judge will grant withholding of
removal.66 However, if the bars to withholding of removal do
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 468.
59. Id. at 465.
60. Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2005).
63. See 8 C.F.R. 208.17 (2006).
64. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
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apply and the Immigration Judge finds that the alien is more
likely than not to be tortured in the proposed country of removal, 8
C.F.R. 208.17 requires the Immigration judge to defer removal."
According to the regulations, an alien is not required to apply sep-
arately for deferral of removal." The alien will not be returned to
the proposed country of removal while the order of deferral is in
effect. 9
Thus, under CAT, an applicant can receive withholding of
removal if the applicant can establish that it is more likely than
not he or she would be tortured if removed. However, if the appli-
cant establishes that it is more likely than not he or she would be
tortured, and one or more of the mandatory bars of § 241(b)(3)(B)
apply, the applicant can only receive a deferral of removal under
CAT.
The regulations note that the order of deferral "provides a
much more limited form of protection than does a grant of with-
holding of removal." ° An order of deferral does "not confer upon
the alien any lawful or permanent immigration status in the
United States .... ."" The order is subject to "streamlined and
expeditious review and termination if it is determined that it is no
longer likely that the alien would be tortured" in the proposed
country of removal. 72 In addition, the order of deferral, like with-
holding, does not prevent the government from removing the alien
to another country where the alien would not be tortured.73 The
Immigration Judge is required to inform the alien of the "limited
nature of the deferral order at the time such order is entered.7
For example, in the Posada hearing, the fact that Posada was
granted a deferral of removal does not prevent the United States
from removing him to a country other than Venezuela or Cuba. In
principle, it also does not prevent removal to Venezuela or Cuba at
a later date if it is determined that those countries no longer
engage in the practice of torture.
In Bellout v. Ashcroft, although engaging in terrorist activity
barred the alien from withholding of removal under CAT, he was











lish that it was "more likely than not" that he would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal."5 However, in Bellout
the alien testified to only one incident of abuse by the police before
he joined the "State Department-designated terrorist organiza-
tion"76 and there was "no evidence in the record that the Algerian
government [was] aware that Bellout joined the [designated ter-
rorist organization] or [was] interested in him."77 In addition, the
Immigration Judge found that there was "no evidence that mem-
bers of militant groups who leave Algeria [would] be persecuted or
tortured upon return."78 Because of a lack of evidence, the court
held that the alien "did not meet his burden of establishing it is
more likely than not that he will face torture if returned to Alge-
ria."79 Therefore, Bellout was unable to defer removal under CAT.
Similarly for the husband in Cheema, the Court affirmed the
Board's determination that full relief under CAT was barred. °
However, the court also deferred to the Board's holding that the
alien "may not be deported to the country where he is likely to be
tortured."8 ' This is another example of how "engaging in terrorist
activity" can bar withholding, but cannot completely bar deferral
of removal under CAT.
Bellout and Cheema demonstrate that it can sometimes be
very difficult for an alien to establish that it is more likely than
not he or she will be tortured if removed. However, it is relatively
easy for the country "seeking removal" to take steps in order to
ensure CAT relief will be granted. For example, in the Posada
hearing, the United States government presented no witnesses to
rebut the testimony of Posada's witnesses, who testified that he
would be tortured if sent to Venezuela or Cuba. Jose Pertierra, a
lawyer who represents Venezuela on the Posada case, said after
the decision that, the "[Department of Homeland Security] gave
75. "Although barred from 'withholding of removal' under CAT, Bellout remains
eligible for 'deferral of removal' under CAT. To be eligible for deferral of removal
under CAT, Bellout must establish that he 'is more likely than not to be tortured' if he
returns to Algeria." Bellout v Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8
C.F.R. § 1208.17(a)(2003)); See also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir.
2003).
76. Bellout, 363 F.3d at 977.
77. Id. at 979.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Cheema v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2004).
81. Id.
82. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 3.
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this decision to the judge on a silver platter."8 3 Pertierra also
stated that he felt "deceived with the conduct of the prosecutors
and DHS, which didn't litigate this case in good faith."84 The
Posada decision will be discussed at great lengths infra Part III.
III. IN THE MATTER OF Louis POSADA-CARRILES
A. Events Leading Up to the Decision
In 1976 a bomb was detonated aboard a Cuban airline en
route from Caracas, Venezuela to Havana, Cuba. 5 Seventy-three
people were killed.88 Posada was charged in Venezuela in connec-
tion with the bombing and was acquitted. 7 In 1985, while await-
ing a prosecutor's appeal of the decision, Posada escaped from a
Venezuelan prison.88
In 1997 Posada was implicated in a series of bombings at
Havana hotels and restaurants that injured 11 people and killed
an Italian tourist.89 Posada was wanted in Cuba in connection
with the bombings. 90 In 2000 Posada was arrested for plotting to
kill Cuban President Fidel Castro while the president was attend-
ing a summit in Panama.9' A Panamanian court dropped the most
serious charges. 92 However, in April of 2004 Posada and three
others were convicted on lesser charges and Posada was sentenced
to up to 8 years in prison.9 3 Five months later, then Panamanian
President Mireya Moscosco pardoned Posada.9 4
Posada secretly lived in the Caribbean and Central American
until March of 2005, when he traveled from Guatemala to the
United States-Mexico border and was smuggled into the United
States.95 He then took a bus to South Florida, where he remained
for several months until he was detained.9" On May 10, 2005
declassified CIA and FBI documents suggested that Posada was
83. Corral, supra note 1, at Al.
84. Id.
85. See Gary Marx & Andrew Zajac, Militant Cuban Exile Held after Surfacing in














involved in the 1976 bombing of the Cuban airliner.97 Venezuela
submitted an extradition request to the United States.98 The
United States government then brought proceedings against
Posada in an immigration court in El Paso, Texas, charging
Posada with entering the country illegally. 99
B. The Decision
On September 26, 2005, Immigration Judge William Abbott
ruled that Posada could not be extradited to Venezuela. 100 The
Posada decision is an example of a case in which a suspected ter-
rorist was granted deferral of removal under CAT. Granting of
deferral of removal under CAT is not supposed to be influenced by
the status of the applicant. As Judge William Abbott correctly
asserted in his decision, there are no statutory bars to deferral of
removal, and even "the most heinous terrorist or mass murderer
would qualify for deferral of removal if he or she could establish
the necessary burden of proof regarding the probability of torture
in the future."1 1 However, in practice, as evidenced by Bellout
and Cheema in the discussion above, deferral of removal tends to
be denied or limited in cases involving suspected terrorists.
In the Posada decision, the applicant, Posada, conceded that
he was deportable for being inadmissible and entering the United
States without a proper entry visa.102 Instead, Posada applied for
withholding of removal under Article III of CAT.103 After the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted a motion to
pretermit Posada's application for withholding of removal, Posada
conceded ineligibility for withholding under § 241(b)(3)(B)(iii) for
a "serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before arri-
val."1 4 The DHS stipulated a grant of deferral of removal in rela-
tion to Posada's potential deportation to Cuba.105 However, DHS
did not stipulate as to Posada's request for deferral of removal to
Venezuela.106
97. See id.
98. See Alicia Caldwell, Posada Proceedings Won't Be in Florida MIAMI HERALD,
June 21, 2005, at B3.
99. See id.
100. Corral, supra note 1, at Al.
101. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 5.
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Posada testified that because of his anti-Castro activities he
would be tortured and killed if returned to either Venezuela or
Cuba. °7 In his testimony, Posada said he was particularly wor-
ried that, because of the ties between Castro and Hugo Chavez,
the President of Venezuela, if extradited to Venezuela, he could be
sent to Cuba. 08 Posada also submitted numerous articles and
papers "regarding current affairs in Venezuela and Cuba."0 9 Only
one witness was presented by Posada: attorney Joaquin Fernando
Chaffardet Ramos, an attorney from Venezuela."' Chaffardet tes-
tified that due to Chavez's extraordinary interest in the Posada
case, Posada could not receive and fair trial in Venezuela."' Chaf-
fardet also testified that he personally observed victims of torture
at the hands of Venezuelan security personnel."' No details of
torture were provided in Judge Abbott's written decision.
In response to Posada's testimony, DHS did not submit any
rebuttal evidence relating to Posada's application for deferral of
removal."3 At closing argument, DHS stated that the Venezuelan
Constitution prohibits the extradition of its citizens to other coun-
tries." 4 DHS had "no specific information indicating" that Vene-
zuela would extradite Posada to Cuba."5 However, the United
States Government was "concerned that the growing economic
and political ties between Cuba and Venezuela might persuade
President Chavez to allow Cuban agents to come to Venezuela
where [Posadal could possibly suffer torture at the hands of these
Cuban agents." 6 Again, DHS presented no specific information
that this would happen."
7
Despite the speculative nature of the little evidence presented
at the hearing, Judge Abbott held that, under CAT, it was "more
likely than not" Posada would be tortured if sent to Venezuela."8
Specifically, the Court found that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary:
"that torture exists in Venezuela, although not on a wide-
107. Id.
108. See id. at 2-3.









118. Id. at 7.
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spread scale; that the notoriety of a case does not immunize
the detainee from possible torture; that Cuban authorities,
as a matter of official -policy, engage in the systematic tor-
ture of detainees for the purposes of extracting information,
intelligence, and confessions; that existing cultural, politi-
cal, and economic ties between Cuba and Venezuela make
the case of the respondent problematic in that it appears
plausible that Cuban agents may be allowed to interrogate
the respondent while in the custody of Venezuelan authori-
ties; that it is more likely than not that the Cuban agents
would subject the respondent to torture as this is part of
their interrogation technique; that there is nothing in the
record to suggest that the Venezuelan authorities would
prohibit this practice, and thus, would acquiesce in the tor-
ture of the respondent by Cuban agents."'19
C. Errors and Inconsistencies in the Posada Decision
1. Posada Did Not Meet His Burden of Proof Under CAT
There are many errors in the Posada decision. First, Posada
did not appear to meet his burden of proof under CAT. Judge
Abbott stated that "there is nothing in the record to suggest that
the Venezuelan authorities would prohibit this practice [of tor-
ture].""2 However, under CAT, the burden is on the alien to estab-
lish that it is "more likely than not" that he would be tortured, not
on the authorities of the proposed country of removal.'21 The bur-
den should have been on Posada to present evidence establishing
that it is more likely than not he would be tortured in Venezuela.
Instead, there was a presumption that Posada would be tortured if
sent to Venezuela, and Judge Abbott concluded that there was
nothing in the record that indicated otherwise.'22
Judge Abbott also stated that because of the existing "cul-
tural, political and economic ties between Venezuela and Cuba"
that it "appears plausible" that Cuban agents "may be allowed" to
interrogate Posada "while in the custody of Venezuela.""23 Judge
Abbot then found that "it is more likely than not that the Cuban
agents would subject the respondent to torture as this is part of
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. "The burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal . . . to
establish that it is more likely than not the he or she would be tortured if removed to
the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2006).
122. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 6.
123. Id.
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their interrogation technique."24 Thus, Judge Abbott's reasoning
is that since it "appears plausible" that Cuban agents "may be
allowed" to enter Venezuela to interrogate Posada, and because
Cuban agents are "more likely than not" to torture Posada if
allowed in Venezuela, it is "more likely than not" that Posada
would be tortured if removed to Venezuela. The conclusion does
not logically follow from the speculative nature of the presump-
tions. "Appears plausible" and "may be allowed" do not rise to the
level of "more likely than not." Since these two conditions are nec-
essary for Cuban agents to even enter Venezuela, the conclusion
that it is "more likely than not" that Posada would be tortured at
the hands of the Cuban agents is illogical. Therefore Judge
Abbott erred as a matter of both logic and law when he held that it
was "more likely than not" that Posada would be tortured if
removed to Venezuela.
The arguments presented by the United States Government
and DHS were also equally speculative. For example, the United
States Government was "concerned" that because of the growing
economic ties President Chavez "might" be persuaded to allow
Cuban agents to come to Venezuela. 1 5 In addition, the Govern-
ment evidence stated that if the Cuban agents were to arrive,
Posada "could possibly" be tortured by these Cuban agents. 26
Thus, there was a "concern" that something "might" happen that
could lead to the "possibility" of something else happening. This
combination should not lead to a conclusion that the "something
else" is "more likely than not" to happen, as required to gain a
deferral of removal under CAT. Yet, this evidence, in combination
with the testimony of Posada, the applicant seeking relief, and a
Venezuelan lawyer, who happened to be an "old friend" of
Posada's 27 , was enough to satisfy the "more likely than not" stan-
dard required to gain deferral of removal under CAT.
124. Id. While, this finding was based upon "all country reports, both Department
of State and other Non-governmental organizations," details of the reports and details
of the interrogation techniques in question were not provided in Judge Abbott's
decision. See id.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Corral, supra note 1, at Al. "The judge hinged his decision on testimony from
Posada and Venezuelan lawyer Joaquin Chaffardet, an old friend of Posada's who told
Abbott that Venezuela would surely torture Posada."
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2. The Posada Decision is Inconsistent with Other CAT
Decisions Involving Venezuelan Citizens
Two recent cases have denied withholding of removal under
CAT for Venezuelan applicants. In Rosal-Olavarrieta v. Gonzales,
petitioner Rosal, a citizen of Venezuela, requested deferral of
removal to Venezuela under CAT claiming a well-founded fear of
persecution and/or torture because he was an HIV-positive homo-
sexual man.'28 Rosal testified to past accounts of sexual orienta-
tion harassment and discrimination in Venezuela as well as
extortion by the Venezuelan police.'29 In particular, Rosal testi-
fied that he had been "stopped by the police many times and
forced to pay a bribe or the police would put him in detention with
other prisoners.""' Rosal also claimed he would receive inade-
quate medical treatment in Venezuela. 3' The Immigration Judge
found that Rosal "exaggerated" the incidents of past persecution
and torture by the Venezuelan police and denied CAT relief.'32 On
appeal, Rosal sought to introduce supplemental evidence of past
persecution and torture, on account of difficulties communicating
with his counsel.' 33 The Board of Immigration Appeals refused,
concluding that Rosal "had an adequate opportunity to develop his
allegations of persecution but had failed to do so. ' ' 34 The Third
Circuit affirmed the decision, finding that Rosal failed to provide
credible testimony of past persecution.
35
In Ortega v. U.S. Attorney General, applicant Ortega, a Vene-
zuelan citizen originally admitted into the United States on a non-
immigrant visitor visa, sought withholding of removal to Vene-
zuela under CAT.' 36 Ortega alleged that he had received threaten-
ing phone calls and had been physically attacked because of his
political opinion.' 37 He also stated that he feared he would be
killed if returned to Venezuela. 3 8 Ortega testified that he had
participated in several marches and protests in opposition to Ven-
ezuelan President Hugo Chavez and that he acted as armed secur-
128. Rosal-Olavarrieta v. Gonzales, 134 F. App'x 593 (3rd Cir. 2005).
129. Id. at 594.
130. Id. at 595.
131. Id. at 594.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 595.
135. Id.
136. Ortega v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 161 F. App'x. 830 (11th Cir. 2006).
137. Id. at 831.
138. Id.
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ity for a regional governor opposing Chavez. 139 Ortega visited the
United States after beginning his political involvement, but
returned to Venezuela without requesting asylum. 4 ° Upon
returning to Venezuela, Ortega received at least five calls from an
unidentified man who Ortega believed to be affiliated with the
Bolavarian Circle, a pro-Chavez group."' The unidentified man
used "filthy language," called Ortega a traitor, and told Ortega to
stop participating in demonstrations opposing Chavez.' These
calls were not reported to the police because Ortega feared the
police were controlled by Chavez.14 1 One morning, Ortega was
attacked and beaten while on his way to work.'" Following the
attack, Ortega received another call reiterating warnings.
Ortega then decided to leave Venezuela.
146
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the Immigration Judge's denial
of asylum.'47 The court found that that there was substantial evi-
dence to support the Immigration Judge's conclusion that Ortega
failed to establish past persecution. 4 ' It reasoned that, "although
the phone calls and attack may support a finding of persecution,
they do not necessarily compel such a conclusion."1 49 In addition,
the court stated that "a single attack and a few phone calls does
not rise to the level of persecution." 50 The court also found that
the Immigration Judge "properly determined that Ortega failed to
show an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution."' The
court stated that Ortega did not offer any specific evidence show-
ing a causal connection between the attack and Ortega's political
expression,1 52 despite the fact that Ortega received threatening
calls telling him to stop his demonstrations prior to and directly
after the attack.' Because Ortega's asylum claim failed, the
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147. Id. at 834.
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149. Id. (citing Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)).
150. Id. (citing Sepulueda, 401 F.3d at 1231).
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Unlike Posada, the applicants in Rosal and Ortega presented
specific instances in which they were threatened. Ortega also pro-
vided an instance in which he was physically attacked. Despite
these specific instances of conduct, both Rosal's and Ortega's
claims failed, while Posada's succeeded. Consistency amongst
applicants seeking withholding of removal under CAT is, of
course, unlikely if not impossible. Here, however, the inconsis-
tency between applicants all seeking withholding of removal to
Venezuela is beyond glaring.
3. The Posada Decision is Inconsistent with United
States' Practices and Policies
The granting of deferral of removal to Posada is also inconsis-
tent with the current position of the United States on the "harbor-
ing" of terrorists. In a public response before Congress and the
nation to the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United
States, President Bush stated: "Either you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that contin-
ues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United
States as a hostile regime."155 In his State of the Union Address in
2002, President Bush stated that ". . .so long as nations harbor
terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not
and will not allow it."156 In a speech to the nation attempting to
justify the impending war in Iraq, President Bush reiterated his
statement from his 2002 State of the Union Address, stating:
"When I spoke to Congress more than a year ago, I said that those
who harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves." '157
Despite these statements of policy from the President, the
United States is currently "harboring" Posada, a suspected terror-
ist. Not only is the United States currently holding Posada, the
government did not even attempt to present a case against Posada
which would have extradited him to a country where he was
awaiting trial for his terrorist activity. As a result of the decision,
it is unlikely that Posada will ever be brought to justice. This
other claims for withholding of removal under the INA or under CAT generally fail."
Id. (citing Forgue v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005)).
155. President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1140, 1142
(Sept. 20, 2001).
156. President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 129, 131 (Jan. 29, 2002).
157. Address to the Nation on Iraq From Cincinnati, Ohio, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1716, 1717 (Oct. 7, 2002).
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severely undermines the credibility of the United States in its
"Var on Terror."
The Posada decision has exposed the United States to well-
founded cries of hypocrisy regarding the United States' position on
torture. During the "War on Terror", the CIA has allegedly helped
move "dozens of detainees" to Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Syria. 158
This process, known as "extraordinary rendition" involves captur-
ing suspected terrorists and sending them to their home countries
or to third countries, some of which have records of torturing their
prisoners. 5 9 Syria, for example, has a strong record of torturing
its prisoners. According to a 2004 State Department Report,
"there was credible evidence that security forces continued to use
torture frequently.1 60 In addition, there were "reports of death in
prison due to torture" and the "torture of political detainees was a
common occurrence." 6' The report describes the torture methods
in great detail, which includes,
administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails;
forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while
the victim was suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending
the spine; bending the detainees into the frame of a wheel
and whipping exposed body parts; and using a backward-
bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the vic-
tim's spine.1
62
In 2002, the United States Government arrested Canadian
Maher Arar at New York's JFK Airport on a suspicion he was
engaging in terrorism.63 Maher Arar was then sent to Syria
where he was tortured and his hands "repeatedly whipped with
cables."" He was released after one year and it was announced
that there were no findings of any terrorist links.'65 He is cur-
rently suing the United States Government. 6 6 Recently, Robert
Tuttle, the United States ambassador to London was "forced to
retract his categorical denial that the US had sent any terrorism
158. David E. Kaplan, Playing Offense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 2, 2003.
159. Ian Fisher, Reports of Secret U.S. Prisons in Europe Draw Ire and Otherwise
Red Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A14.
160. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dept. of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004: Syria (2005).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Gordon Rayner, Dark Secrets of the 'Black Site' Prisons, DAILY MAIL (London),






suspects to Syria, a country that routinely practises torture."'6
Also, a formal investigation by a 46-member committee of the
European Parliament was initiated in January 2006 after it was
reported that CIA aircraft have transported terrorist suspects
across Europe to countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia.
168
In addition to transferring detainees to countries that engage
in torture, the United States may be engaging in many of the
same interrogation techniques that Judge Abbot condemned in
the Posada decision. There are many reports of torture at the
Guantanamo detention camps where hundreds of prisoners, only
some suspected of terrorism, are being held. A recent United
Nations report documented some of the "authorized" techniques,
including the use of dogs, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep
deprivation for several consecutive days, and prolonged isola-
tion. 69  While individual use of these techniques is "perceived as
causing severe suffering," the simultaneous use of the techniques
probably amounts to torture. 7 ° In addition, there are reports of
torture at secret prisons in Afghanistan. 7' There is also photo-
graphic evidence of the treatment of prisoners at Iraq's Abu
Ghraib prison that provides tangible examples of the United
States military torturing Iraqi prisoners.'72 The evidence that the
United States engages in the practice of torture seems far more
convincing than the testimony of a single paid lawyer on which
Judge Abbott based his decision in the Posada case.
167. Anton La Guardia, US Ambassador Corrects Slip-up over Sending Suspects to
Syria, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 27, 2005 at 16.
168. John Crewdson, EU Parliament Launches Inquiry into 'Renditions', CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 20, 2006, at C6.
169. Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention et al., Report on the
Situation of Detainees at Guantdnamo Bay, 52, delivered to the Comm'n on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.412006/120 (Feb. 15 2006) (prepared by Leila Zerrougui et al).
170. See id.
171. "Eight men at the American detention camp in Guantanamo Bay have
separately given their lawyers 'consistent accounts' of being tortured at a secret
prison in Afghanistan at various periods from 2002 to 2004 .... [T]hey say they were
chained to walls, deprived of food and drinking water, and kept in total darkness with
loud rap or heavy metal music blaring for weeks at a time." Carlotta Gall, The Reach
of War: Detainees; Rights Group Reports Afghanistan Torture, NY TIMES, Dec. 19,
2005, at A14.
172. The photographs, originally obtained by CBS for 60 Minutes II, included a
photo of naked Iraqi prisoners stacked in a human pyramid (one with a slur written
on his skin in English), a photo of a prisoner standing on a box with his head covered
and wires attached to his body, and a photo of male prisoners positioned to simulate
sex with each other. James Risen, Treatment of Prisoners: G.1.'s Are Accused of
Abusing Iraqi Captives, NY TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A15.
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The Bush Administration has fought efforts from Congress to
ban United States forces from "cruel, inhuman or degrading"
treatment of its detainees.'73 In additiori, the Bush Administra-
tion attempted "to limit the definition of torture to that which
inflicts agony just short of the pain of organ failure or death."
174
Since the Posada decision, and as a result of worldwide scrutiny
over Abu Ghraib and the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, the
United States has had to reconsider its position on torture. The
Bush Administration faced heavy pressure from Congress to sup-
port a ban on the torture of detainees. In December of 2005, the
Bush Administration finally agreed to a ban on torture.'75 Amend-
ments set out in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 place a pro-
hibition on "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment" of persons under control of the United States
Government.'76
However, the potential deterrent effect of the amendment was
lessened by a last-minute change that added protection against
litigation for those conducting such interrogations. 77 This provi-
sion allows United States personnel a defense when dealing with
suspected terrorists that such personnel "did not know that the
practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and under-
standing would not know the practices were unlawful."7 8 It also
states that "good faith reliance on advice of counsel should be an
important factor, among others, to consider in assessing whether
a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have known
the practices to be unlawful.' 79
In addition, when signing the bill, President Bush issued a
"'signing statement,' saying he would interpret the restrictions in
the context of his broader constitutional powers as commander in
chief."8 ° According to the Boston Globe, "[a] senior administration
official later confirmed that the president believes the Constitu-
tion gives him the power to authorize interrogation techniques
that go beyond the law to protect national security." 8' This has
173. Lisa T. Cullen, Pushing the Limits, TIME, Jan. 9, 2006, at 26.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Div. A, Title X, § 1003,
119 Stat. 2680 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
177. See Cullen, supra note 173.
178. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1004.
179. Id.
180. Charlie Savage, 3 GOP Senators Blast Bush Bid to Bypass Torture Ban,




set off an intense battle between Congress and the Executive
Branch over the authority of the President to act beyond the law.
It also fuels claims of hypocrisy from those nations whose extradi-
tion requests the United States has denied on account of the prac-
tice of torture.
D. The Posada Decision Appears to be the Result of
Politics
There are strong indications that the Posada decision was
politically-based. The attorneys for the Department of Homeland
Security did not present its best case against Posada to prevent a
deferral of removal. Indeed, they barely presented any case at all.
Rather, DHS attorneys expressed concern that Venezuela might
let Cuban agents into Venezuela where Posada "could possibly
suffer torture" at the hands of these agents."8 2 Because the DHS
attorneys did not even perform their most minimum duty as pros-
ecutors, there is an appearance that their actions were influenced
by a higher authority.
There are several possible reasons why the United States did
not want Posada extradited to Venezuela. One possible reason is
that the government wanted to appease Cuban American organi-
zations, particularly in the critical election state of Florida. The
Cuban American vote represents a strong and important base for
the current Administration and many elected representatives.
Right wing exile organizations have a strong influence over the
vote, and these organizations are as active, relentless, and uncom-
promising as any in the United States. Many Cuban Americans
have been told and believe that Posada is a "freedom fighter" or a
"patriot," notwithstanding Posada's suspected terrorist activity."' 8
In a recent poll conducted by Coral Gables-based Bendixen &
Associates, over 65% of Cuban exiles living in South Florida have
a "positive opinion" of Posada.84 In addition, 61% of exiles feel
that he is a patriot rather than a terrorist.18 Sergio Bendixen,
who funded the poll, said "Cuban exiles feel that when Posada was
committing all of these acts of violence, that was the strategy then
and he was following orders from the CIA .... And they don't
think it's fair to punish him now because the strategy has
182. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 3.
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changed." 86 Knowing that much of the Cuban American support
for the Administration could be lost if Posada were brought to trial
in Venezuala, perhaps those government officials sensitive to the
desires of Cuban exile groups had an influence over the DHS's
trial strategy.
Another reason why the United States did not want Posada
removed to Venezuela may have to do with Posada's history with
the United States Government. The CIA trained Posada to take
part in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion." 7 Posada also worked for
the CIA in Miami and later helped the United States arm Contras
in Nicaragua. 8" Judge Abbott in his opinion acknowledged that
Posada was a "cold war warrior, working on behalf of the United
States in the early days of the Cuban problem."8 9 It is entirely
possible that not removing Posada to Venezuela is a reward for his
service to the United States government during the Cold War. It
is also possible that, if there were a public trial in Venezuela, this
information would likely be brought to the forefront of main-
stream media. Not only does this information have the potential
to embarrass the United States, it is possible that there is other
information even more embarrassing that could surface during
the course of a trial.
E. Implications of the Posada Decision and Other
Decisions Under CAT
A denial of the extradition of a suspected terrorist on the
basis of CAT can have far-reaching political repercussions. In
some cases such a denial is tantamount to saying that another
country condones or endorses torture. The decision not to extra-
dite Posada to Venezuela has already strained the fragile rela-
tions between Venezuela and the United States. Before the
Posada decision, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez stated "if the
United States does not extradite Luis Posada Carriles, we will be
forced to reconsider our diplomatic ties .... We will have to con-
sider whether it's worth having an embassy there, and whether
it's worth the United States having an embassy here." 90
186. Id.
187. Nicole Gaouette and Lianne Hart, Lawyer Seeks Asylum, Venue Change for
Cuban Exile, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A23.
188. Id.
189. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 5.
190. Christopher Toohaker, Venezuela: Chavez Threatens Ties with U.S. Over
Posada, MIAMi HERALD, May 23, 2005, at A16.
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Since the decision, top Venezuelan diplomat for North
America, Maria del Pilar Herndndez, stated, "I would like for
them to present just one piece of evidence that Venezuela tortures
people when our constitution clearly establishes the prohibition of
torture."'' Two days after the Posada decision, President Chavez
pointed out the hypocrisy, "In Guantfinamo [the United States]
torture[s] people. They're the ones who torture. They murder, they
bomb, they kill children - and now a judge over there says he
[Posadal can't go to Venezuela because he runs the risk of being
tortured here."192 The Venezuelan Ambassador to the United
States, Bernardo Alvarez, also challenged the decision not to
extradite Posada to Venezuela.'93
Given the reaction of Venezuelan officials to the Posada deci-
sion, if an act of terrorism were committed in the United States
and the terrorist fled to Venezuela, it is highly unlikely that the
terrorist would be returned to the United States to stand trial.
One can only imagine the outrage of the American public if an
associate of Osama Bin Laden were found in Venezuela, and the
Venezuelan government refused to extradite him to the United
States, finding it more likely than not that he would be tortured if
removed.
In a recent ruling in London, cleric Abu Hamza was convicted
of inciting his supporters to kill Jews and non-Muslims.' Abu
Hamza is also wanted in the United States on charges of "trying to
establish a terrorist training camp in Oregon, conspiring to take
hostages in Yemen, and facilitating terror training in Afghani-
stan."'95 The United States is seeking extradition after Abu
Hamza serves his seven year sentence. Justice Department
spokesman Bryan Sierra said that the United States "stands
ready to resume the extradition proceedings against Abu Hamza
when British law allows."'96 What would happen if Great Britain
deferred removal under CAT, finding that it is more likely than
not that he would be tortured if removed to the United States?
Unfortunately, it would not be unreasonable for a Judge in Great
Britain to make such a finding, given the treatment of terrorist
191. Ian James, Venezuela Criticizes Court Ruling on Posada, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
29, 2005, at A12.
192. Id.
193. See James Morrison, Venezuela Tango, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A13.
194. See Tariq Panja, Cleric in Britain Gets 7 Years for Inciting, PHILA. INQUIRER,
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suspects at Guantanamo. The political and foreign relations fall-
out would be tremendous. However, it is unlikely that such a rul-
ing would be issued given current relations between the United
States and Great Britain.
F. Note on the Aftermath of the Posada Decision
Since gaining a deferral of removal, Posada pushed for full
release from the El Paso immigration detention facility.19 7 How-
ever, his release was dependent on "demonstrating to the satisfac-
tion of the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security
that [he] will not pose a danger to the community and [he] will not
pose a flight risk."198 On March 22, 2006, the United States gov-
ernment decided that it would not free Posada. 199 A letter to
Posada from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) designated Posada as a "flight risk" and as someone having
a "history of engaging in criminal activity, associating with indi-
viduals involved in criminal activity, and participating in violent
acts that indicate a disregard for the safety of the general
public."20
Posada has filed for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court in
El Paso, arguing that he "has been detained longer than six
months and that ICE has 'failed to provide' evidence that he poses
a danger to the community or national security."21 Posada also
contends that he was "a loyal servant of the United States who
advanced the national interest."2 2 If his petition is successful, it
is possible that Posada will avoid a criminal trial altogether for
his alleged involvement in the bombing of a Cuban airliner tlat
killed seventy-three people and the bombing of a Cuban hotel that
killed an Italian tourist.
23
IV. IDEAS FOR MODIFYING CAT
One way to avoid the gross miscarriage of justice in cases like
197. Oscar Corral, Ruling on Whether Posada Can Remain in U.S. is Only Weeks
Away, MiAMi HERALD, Jan. 7, 2006, at B3.
198. Id.
199. Alfonso Chardy, Luis Posada Carriles Case: Posada Called a National Security
Risk, MIAMI HERALD, April 1, 2006, at B3.
200. Id.
201. Alfonso Chardy, Federal Court: Posada Seeks Release From Federal Detention,
MiAMi HERALD, April 7, 2006, at B3.
202. Id.
203. As of May 11, 2006, a ruling on Posada's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
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Posada would be to modify CAT to require the government seek-
ing extradition to present its case against the alien in "good faith."
This would discourage governments from presenting weak cases
in an attempt to withhold or defer the extradition of an alien.2 °4 In
the Posada case, the government did not present any witnesses to
rebut the testimony of Posada that he would be tortured if
removed to Venezuela." 5 If there were a "good faith" requirement,
perhaps a stronger case would have been presented against
Posada and the political fallout could have been reduced. A "good
faith" provision would also reduce or prevent the appearance of
Presidential and other Executive influence in the decision. In
addition, such a provision would help fulfill the professional ethi-
cal requirements likely breached by the government attorneys in
Posada.
The law of CAT in the United States is also still largely unde-
veloped. There has yet to be a Supreme Court case deciding a
CAT claim. Clearer standards need to be delineated by the
Supreme Court to resolve the struggle to define "engaging in ter-
rorist activity" under CAT. In addition, there is still ambiguity
over what constitutes torture for the purposes of deferral of
removal. A clearer definition of torture, either set out by the
Supreme Court or by Congress, would help make decisions under
CAT more consistent. What constitutes a "likelihood" of torture
also needs to be more clearly defined. The Supreme Court in Car-
dozo-Fonseca and numerous other cases have squarely faced a
range of "likelihood" issues.0 6 It could do so here as well. These
steps would help to reduce the perception of American political
and ideological bias towards one country over another when
removing aliens.
V. CONCLUSION
Decisions under CAT can have political implications beyond
the scope of the individual applicant seeking relief. A major short-
204. It would also discourage governments from presenting misleading cases in
cases in which there is a legitimate and immediate threat of torture in the proposed
country of removal.
205. Posada Immigration Decision, supra note 2, at 3.
206. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The Supreme Court dealt with
an interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act provision requiring an alien
to make a showing that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to
persecution" in the country. Id. The Court looked to Congressional intent to
determine its meaning and set out a clear standard for when "more likely than not"
was met under the INA. Id.
20061 595
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3
coming of CAT is the inevitable political and foreign policy
problems it presents and indeed encourages. Although CAT is
designed to be a humanitarian project, it cannot escape sovereign
politics. Because of this, it is necessary that decisions under CAT
be carefully made. It would also be helpful if the standards for
relief under CAT were clearer so as to prevent the appearance of
political influence or bias towards any particular country.
The Posada decision represents the malleability of CAT and
how a government can take political advantage of its malleability
at the expense of justice. The government in the Posada decision
did not present its best case against Posada. As a result, it is pos-
sible that there will never be justice for the family members of the
seventy-three people who died in the bombing of the Cuban airline
in 1976 or the family of the Italian tourist who was killed in 1997.
In addition, the Posada decision has the potential to severely
undermine the credibility of the United States in its "War on Ter-
ror." Modifications of CAT are necessary so as to avoid decisions
such as Posada in the future. However, in the absence of such
modifications, those nations that are members of CAT must act
more responsibly, especially when dealing with suspected ter-
rorists, to avoid such political, inconsistent, and unjust decisions.
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